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Language and Thought:
Some Dangerous Distinctions
Kenneth Badley
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Ken Badley shows how influential the classifications we use are on how we think. With a series
of examples he warns us against the unclear thinking and the faulty results that flow from
inappropriate categorizations.
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Mr. Badley is a recent graduate of Regent College (Dip.C.S.'81) and is currently continuing
studies at Regent in the Master of Christian Studies program.
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It has become popular of late to identify
and criticize various sorts of jargon and misuse of language. This popularity is evidenced
in newspapers and popular magazines. New
York Times readers are regularly treated by
William Safire. Time paid attention to ordinary speech with an essay called "'80's Babble:
Untidy Treasure" (January 28, 1980). Various
Christian publications have taken notice of
speech patterns as well.
Such popularity is not necessarily a bad
thing, for it is important that people attend to
their linguistic habits and note their frequent
reliance on "buzz-words", cliches, and meaningless verbiage. In his essay "Politics and the
English Language", George Orwell remarked
that "the slovenliness of our language makes it
easier for us to have foolish thoughts." His
assertion touches on another aspect of how we
use language, or perhaps in this case, of "how
language uses us". I am referring here to the
influence of speech habits on thought patterns.
This is an aspect of language-use that, while
more important than how jargon infiltrates our
vocabularies or how we "misuse" language,
has, up until now, received far less attention.
If Orwell's comment is true and some of our
foolish thoughts do find their root in our slovenly language then the connections between
language and thought warrant examination.
A centrally important area of connection
between language and thought is that of
classification (organization, categorization).
We "classify" whenever we treat something or
someone as part of a group or class of things
or people, usually on the basis of some shared
characteristic(s). It is by means of classification that we make sense of an otherwise
inchoate world of individual stones, books,

fences, ideas, presidents, cars and trucks. To
state the point another way, classification is
necessary.
Some students of language, in fact, go so
far as to say that classification determines "in
large measure" the way we react to that which
is classified (Wendall Johnson, People in Quandaries, p. 261).
B.L. Whorf asserts an even
stronger hypothesis than that of Johnson. He
claims that language
ordains the forms and categories by
which the personality not only communicates, but also analyzes nature,
notices or neglects relationships and
phenomena, channels his reasoning
and builds the house of his consciousness (Language, Thought and Reality,
p. 252).
Whorf's ideas were widely accepted initially,
but have since been largely rejected for being
too extreme. While there is this wide agreement that Whorf was wrong in thinking that
language determines thought to such great
degree, few claim that he was wrong in the
general direction of his thought. Language
does determine the ways in which people think
to some extent.
In the classification process, language can
exert its influence on thought at two points
especially. First, the names or titles we give
to our categories influence us and others positively or negatively about the individual things
or persons we sort into those categories. This
connects up with attaching labels and stereotyping, both of which are important, but
neither of which can be our particular concern
herein. The second sort of influence language
has on thought within the broad area of classi-

26
fication is our concern here: that is, that we
are often led on by our use of familiar, indeed
well-worn, verbal categorizations with the
result that we make logical or mental classifications inappropriate or inadequate to take
into account that which we are thinking about
or classifying. Noting the possibility of faulty
thinking does not constitute a call for the
abolition of categorization or organized
thought. Genesis chapter 2 records how God
commanded Adam to distinguish between or
classify - to name - the animals. Running
throughout the Bible is an underlying distinction between obedience and disobedience. In
his commentary on Second Corinthians, P.E.
Hughes notes that "the ultimate and radical
division of persons before God is that between
believers and unbelievers, between those who
are in Christ and those who are not" (p. 245).
Classification per se, then, is not the main
concern.
But when the ways we classify
hinder clear thinking or actively lead us into
foolishness, then we must be concerned. We
will now examine a few examples from everyday speech that illustrate how we can be led
astray in our thinking when we are not careful
about our talking.
One obvious example of an inadequate
classification system is to be found when we
consider the sorts of persons who identify
themselves as Christians. No simple, twocategory division is adequate to account for
the variety of sorts, yet the linguistic pair
"conservative/liberal" frequently forces itself
on the consciousness. If we accept the linguistic polarity, it will dictate, in part, the sort of
thinking we do about those varieties of people.
It will be with great difficulty that we would
be able to think clearly about the persons in
question if we were to attempt to do so using
the categories furnished by the polarity in
question. The trio of words often used to
identify churches - "evangelistic/social action/renewal" is similarly inadequate to take
into account the varied matter at hand. But,
like "conservative/liberal", despite its inadequacy, it is deeply, even unnoticeably
imbedded in our language and we often allow
it to wrongly channel our thinking.
Notice the distinction between "church"
and "para-church". As we consider the word
"church" we see there are a number of senses
or meanings. "Church" is used to mean local
assembly or congregation, denomination or
body of Christ ..• plus a number of other
things. But "para-church", if not considered
carefully, can register on the consciousness
and even work its way into the consciousness

as in some way outside the Church universal,
the last sense of "church" listed above. We
may mean to distinguish such groups or organizations from local congregations, but we
possibly allow a seed of exclusivism to invade
our thinking if we do not remember that
"church" has many senses. When we do end up
in faulty thinking such as this we should make
an adjustment in our categories. But we often
keep the faulty linguistic distinction because
of its familiarity and make the adjustment in
our understanding of the reality about us instead. In this way we construct a faulty view
of the world. Exactly what Orwell said would
happen takes place and our foolishness hinders
our efforts.
One further polarity warrants detailed inspection, not only because it is dangerous, but
because it uncovers a whole nest of logical and
linguistic confusions surrounding a concept
with which many Christians are properly (and
some centrally) concerned:
"integration".
This polarity comes in various forms:
we
sometimes hear people say, "He missed heaven
by eighteen inches, the distance from his head
to his heart." Or we hear the commonplace,
"Theological students' heads swell and their
hearts shrink during their time of study."
These two sayings, and others which, in some
similar fashion, admit to a divorce between
the intellectual and the spiritual, do not surprise us. At least two things foster this lack
of surprise, both having to do with familiarity:
the distinction explicit in the phrases is a
familiar part of our thinking and the metaphoric use of "heart" is so deeply imbedded in
Western thought (and, one might note, Christian thought) that it is, to use a technical
term, a "dead" metaphor, one of which few
people any longer take note. When we speak
of the heart as the "seat" of the emotions or
the source of the feelings we can tend to
forget that it is merely a muscle, albeit a vital
one, for pumping blood through the arterial
and veinal systems. When we forget we are
using "heart" metaphorically when we put it to
work in this fashion, it can become a dangerous and misleading metaphor.
We become
victims of our own picturesque language with
the result that we come to view the emotional, feeling, spiritual "part" of our lives as just
that - a part of our lives. Furthermore, we
come to view this "part" as separate from and
opposed to rationality, thought and the intellectual "part" of our lives which we view as
"seated" in the head. In short, we become
trapped.
The fact that picturesqueness is identified
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as part of the problem does not mean we
should eradicate metaphor from our language.
On the contrary, metaphor helps keep language from becoming boring, among other
things. The metaphor in question - that of the
heart as the seat of the emotions - might even
be argued to be useful in terms of verbal
economy (using fewer words to convey an
idea), besides its obvious contribution of picturesqueness. But this "heart" metaphor, and
the polarity of which, in this case, it is a part,
refuses to relinquish its hold on our consciousness. We are hard-pressed to find new ways to
speak about how the spiritual and intellectual
aspects of life are inter-related. Additionally,
our attempts to think about what is a problem lagging spiritual fervor among theological
students (another metaphor) - are hindered
because the language and the logical
categories made available by the language
force us to conceive of the problem in only
one, and in this case, inappropriate, way. We
attempt to solve a problem according to how
we conceive of the problem and if we conceive
of it in the wrong way we will probably not
succeed in solving it.
Some who have recognized how "heart" and
"head" can come to have these dangerous
senses have attempted a move in the right
direction by using the word "integration". We
frequently hear that some book, magazine or
college will help the Christian integrate his or
her "faith and learning" or "faith and life". It
is probably safe to suppose that the people
using "integrate" in such phrases want to
demonstrate the inter-relatedness of faith and
learning or faith and life; they are trying to
communicate that they have some notion of
"all truth being God's truth", "taking every
thought captive to the obedience of Christ",
"thinking Christianly" (as H. Blamires discusses
in The Christian Mind) or some similar idea.
We would expect little protest that any school
or publication should have such noble aims.
Yet phrases employing "integration" in the
above ways accomplish two things that run
directly counter to the purposes I attributed to
the sort of people who use the word. First,
"integration" persists in implying the existence
of some basic division between faith and whatever it is that is to be integrated with faith.
We adopt a word to indicate that we want
people to understand the nature of the relations between Christian faith and all we are
and do, but the word we choose cons ti tut es an
admission that the two are separate and refuse
to go together easily. Thus we see that we
have conceived of the problem wrongly: it is

not that we want to relate two things, but that
they are naturally related and we want people
to view them in that way. Yet "integration"
carries the connotation that we wish to join
these two separate and in some elusive way,
incompatible entities.
The second destructive accomplishment of
"integration" is that it reduces the Christian
faith to a level of logical equality with what
ever it is it is being integrated with, whether
that be "faith and learning", "faith and life",
or, say, "Christianity and psychology". The
question must be asked "How is the foundational 'thing' which
underlies,
informs,
undergirds, overarches, motivates all one is
and does and wants to become and do, how
does this 'thing' - Christianity - integrate with
one's job, one's learning or one's life?" Since
the Christian faith which, in some senses,
(again, what words does one use?) constitutes
the basis of the person's life, is of a different
logical sort from anything else which may be a
"part" of that person's life, perhaps "integration" should be qualified and used with caution
if it must be used.
The word "integration", then, not only admits to and continues to remind us of an old
divorce we never wanted and are trying to
forget, but renders "faith" the logical equivalent of whatever "part" of life it is we are
talking about integrating with faith; it treats
faith as logically similar to a discipline of
study, a hobby or a vocation.
In light of the weaknesses of "integration"
a replacement word or metaphor for it should
be sought, one that has the strengths of "integration" but answers the two objections to
"integration" I have raised herein. "Interwoven" (the tapestry metaphor) comes to mind
as a possibility. It catches the sense of interrelatedness better than "integration" does.
Yet it logically reduces Christianity in the
same, or perhaps a worse way, than "integration" does. Both criticisms must be answered
for a replacement to be satisfactory.
Two further concluding remarks are in
order. First, for all its drawbacks, at the
present time "integration" seems to be the
best word available to catch all that we mean
when we talk about "integration". We thus
may have no choice but to continue to use it,
but we should always keep aware of how it
imports other, destructive notions along with
the notions we might intend at any particular
time. Having begun to win the battle by recognizing some weaknesses of the "heart/head"
polarity, let us not lose it by careless overuse
or even careless use of "integration".
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Second, and finally, since the best method
of teaching the meanings of words is demonstrating how they are used in actual language,
let us demonstrate what "integration" means
by our own lives. The Bible says we are "new

creatures" if we are in Christ. Let us let our
new creature-liness show how the spiritual is
not a "part" of life at all; let us be integrated
in that sense of the word.
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Book Reviews
Prices are given in American dollars
unless otherwise noted.

Solzhenitsyn: The Moral Vision, by Edward
E. Ericson, Jr. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980,
239 pp., $12.95.
In the introduction to this book, Ericson
makes clear something that not all of Solzhenitsyn's public know.
Although Solzhenitsyn
made public his commitment to Christianity
only in the early l 970's, his faith had been
hammered out on the anvil of the Archipelago
years of the l 940's, when he moved from Marx
to Christ. The consistent moral vision that
Ericson claims for Solzhenitsyn, he insists, is
based on his Christian faith and permeates all
of his writing, even the earliest. Believing
that the Russian novelist has been largely
misunderstood and misinterpreted, Ericson
sets out to explain his moral vision to two
kinds of readers: the general reader (nonChr istian and Christian) and specialists in the
Slavic language and literature who, he believes,
will bear "the major burden of mediating
Solzhenitsyn to future generations of readers."
Misinterpretation of Solzhenitsyn arises
mainly from the media, and although this fact
is recognized by many thinking people, Ericson
is to be congratulated on his courage in saying
it out loud. Ericson points out how commentators and news writers fasten on Solzhenitsyn's
non-literary speeches and letters, for example,
"A World Split Apart" (the Harvard Address),
and slip out illustrative references to the
Vietnam war, pornography, television programming, etc., which comprise only fugitive
passages, and blow them up to seem the burden of his message. This intellectual dishonesty
he shows also in the media's strident and huffy
reaction to Solzhenitsyn's exposure of the
materialism and decadence of the West while,
at the same time, it underplays the Russian
writer's careful analysis of the underlying
cause (largely secular humanism) of the decay.

To all the negative furor in the Western press
to the published Letter to the Soviet Leaders,
which decried Solzhenitsyn's nationalism, isolationism, authoritarianism and rejection of
scientific technology, Ericson makes a single,
devastating reply: "The first thing to understand about it is that it was intended to be
practical advice to those aging men who actually held power in the Soviet Union. They are
the audience, not Western intellectuals."
Ericson's book covers a wide spectrum of
Solzhenitsyn's writings. However, the claim of
Malcolm Muggeridge in the "foreword" that
the author "takes the reader systematically
through all Solzhenitsyn's works", cannot be
substantiated.
Ericson himself tells of his
regret that The Oak and the Calf was not
published at the time he wrote his book, and
therefore he could not deal with it. Solzhenitsyn's Letter to the Third Council of the
Russian Church Abroad is not mentioned, nor
is his letter to the Secretariat of the Soviet
Writer's Union upon learning of his dismissal
from the Union on November 12, 1969 ("Blow
the dust off the clock. Your watches are
behind the times.
Throw open the heavy
curtains which are so dear to you. You do not
even suspect that the day has already dawned
outside.").
Significantly, the first work Ericson analyzes is the Nobel Lecture in Literature (1970).
He rightly holds that only a thoughtful reading
of this address will give the reader the clue to
all of Solzhenitsyn's writings, for his theory of
art defined in the address is indeed the only
context within which all his works can be
understood. Like Dorothy Sayers (The Mind of
the Maker), Solzhenitsyn is convinced that art
is a gift from God, and involves the exercising
of the artist's God-given creative ability as "a
common apprentice under God's heaven". As
the artist recognizes these facts, he then realizes his indisputable responsibility to society.
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